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Stoppage in Transitu-Loss of Rijht by Assignment of Bill of Lading,
. as CollateralSecurity. "
The assignment of a bill of lading as collateral security for, tlle"
payment of a loan prevents -the consignor from exercising his right of
stoppage in transitu until he has discharged the debt secured bysitch
transfer.
Thn BPCT o

A P! D(GU Or A BiLL or LAING UPON THx RiGHT
Or STOPPAGs IN TRANSITU. 2

It is a well-kn6wn rule of the
law of sales that an unpaid vendor
has the right of stopping goods
sold and unpaid for after they have
left his possession and before they
come into the actual- or constructiVe possession of the purchaser, or'
those standingin his place, in those
cases where the purchaser has become insolvent. So firmly established is this right -ofthe unpaid.
*vendorthat it can be defeated in
but one way, and that'is by the
assignment of the bill of lading
given for the goods to one who
bonafide gives valaefor a p~ropferty
in the goods (Blackburne on

Sales, 32o).; It thus appears that i
consideration of the' eifct'of thv ,
transfer of 'a bill of lading upon
the right of stoppage in transitt;.

involves a discussion of the property transferred, the consideratinand the bonafides. •
(a) Of the Proprty Traxjfeyed."
-Though the assignment of the
bill of lading, in order to divest the
vendor's right of-stoppage in traisitu, must be in- furtherance of a
contract to give an interest in the
goods for a valuable consideration,
it is not necessary that it should be
a contract to give the whole interest in the goods. It will still effec-

1i7 S. W. Rep., 6o8.
. I do not agree with the writer in the conclusion which he reaches
that the endorsement of the bill of lading to the pledgee puts an end to
the transit and amounts to a delivery. The principles which govern the
rights of the vendor and the pledgee have, however, not yet been
definitely settled, and the note will be useful in keeping alive the interest of the profession in the subject-FRAix P. PRICHARD.
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tively destroy the right, so far as it
was transferred, whether the transfer was to a pledgee or to a techuical purchaser for value: Lickbarrow v. Mason, i Sm. L. C., 763;
Kemp v. Falk, L, R., 7 App. Cas.,
573; Coventry v. Gladstone, L. R.,
b Eq., 44; Schumacher v. Eby, 24
Pa., 528; Skilling v. Bollman, 73
Mo., 665; Mo. Pacific Rwy. v.
HIeidenheimer, 17 S. W. Rep., 6o8;
Shepard''. Newhall, 54 Fed. Rep.,
3o6. On account of space limits'
the present article will be confined
to a discussion of the cases deciding the effect of the transfer of the
bill of lading by way of pledge
upon the right of stoppage in tran.situ.
t\ pledge conveys but a special
property to the pfedgee, while the
general property over and above
the special property remains in the
pledgor. It is, therefore, an important modification of the effect
of a pledge of the bill of lading
upon the right of stoppage in transitu, that the vendor's right will
remain so far as to entitle him to
any surplus proceeds after satisfying the rights of the creditor .to*
whom the bill was transferred as a
security, as measured by the extent
of his advances: In re Westzinthus,
3 B. & Ad., 817; Spalding v. Ruding,
6 Beav., 376; .Ex parle Golding
Davis, L. R., 15 Ch. D., 728;
Chandler v. Fulton, io Texas, 2;
Mo. Pac. Rwy. v. Heidenheimer,
17 S. W. Rep., 6o8. Thus, in a
case where one Westzinthus, of
Leghorn, shipped oil to his purchaser in London, sending him the
bills of lading, and the latter
pledged them to his creditor, Hardman, and the vendor, on hearing
of the purchaser's insolvency,
stopped the goods before their
delivery to Hardman, the stoppage

was held good over and above the
amounts advanced by Hardman:
"For since Westzinthus would have
a clear right at law to resume the
possession of the goods on the insolvency of the vendee had it not
been for the transfer of the property and right of possession by the
indorsement of the bill of lading
for a valuable consideration to
Hardman, it appears to us that in
a court of equity such transfer
would be treated as a pledge "or
mortgage only, and Westzinthus
would be treated as reserving his
former interest in such pledge subject to that of the pledgee or mortgagee:" In re Westzinthus, 5 B. &
Ad., 817.
Now, since a transfer of a bill of
lading for value by way of a pledge
only transfers a property in the
goods represented to the extent of
the consideration, and the title to
the surplus still remains .in the
vendee, subject to the right of
stoppage, clearly this right of the
unpaid vendor covers the whole of
the surplus in the vendee's hands,
and cannot be defeated beyond the
advance by reason of there being
other unpaid debts due the pledgee
by the vendee. Thus, in the case
of Spalding v.Ruding, 6 Beav., 376,
the pledgee of a bill of lading to
goods valued at ,Ci8oo for an advance of £miooo, was .prevented
from interposing other debts due
him by the insolvent vendee for
the purpose of defeating the vendor's right of stoppage in the
balance.
The consignor of the goods has
against the pledgee in such cases
the further equitable right of insisting upon the marshaling of assets:
In re Westzinthus, 5 B. & Ad., 817;
Spalding v .Ruding, 6 Beav., 376;
Kemp v. Falk, 7 App. Cas., 575.
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Thus, in the case of In re Westzinthus, suarn,where the pledgee had
also other property of the consignee
as security, and had sold both that
property and the oil covered by the
bills of lading, other creditors of
the consignee wished to compel
Hardman, the pledgee, to take his
payment equally out of the two
funds, and to be allowed to share
.irorata with Westzinthus in the
total balance. But Lord Dn-NrAN,
in his opinion, said: "If then the
consignor had an equitable right to
the oil subject to the pledgee's lien
thereon for his debt, he would by
means of his goods have become a
surety to the pledgee for the consignee's debt, and would then have
a clear equity to oblige the pledgee
- to have recourse
against the consignee's own goods deposited with
him to pay his debt in ease of the
surety."
(b)Of the Consideration.-The
contract between the parties at thetime of the transfer of the bill of
lading must be based on a valuable
consideration in order to pass a
title to the property symbolized
and defeat the right of stoppage in
transitu. That a consideration advanced at the time of the transfer
of the bill of lading is sufficient is
universally admitted and needs no
other authority than the cases already cited.
But whether a prior indebtedness
is such a consideration for the
transfer of the bill of lading as
will protect the pledgee against the
consignor is a much mooted question. Its determination depends
upon the view adopted by the
courts of the jurisdiction in which
the question may arise as to why
the transfer of the bill of lading
should be allowed to defeat the
right of stoppage in trausitu in any
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instance. That is to say, whether
they think such result is due to the
'commercial nature of the security,
or to estoppel, or to the effect of
the transfer of a bill of lading as a
symbolical delivery of the goods.
(I) From the'CommercialNature
of the Bill of Lading.-Viewing
the bill of lading as an instrument
of commerce, it is likened by analogy to a negotiable instrument. It
is said that its one element of
negotiability, in the sense of giving
the transferee a better title than
the transferror had, consists in the
fact that its transfer bona fide for
value will destroy the right of stoppage in transitu: Anson on Contracts, 23o. And it is held, therefore, that the question of valuable
consideration in the pledge of a
bill of lading for prior indebtedness
depends upon the view adopted by
the courts of that jurisdiction in
the analogous case of the transfer
of a promissory note as collateral
security for an antecedent indebtedness: St. Paul's Rolling Mills Co.
v. Great Western Despatch Co., 27
Fed. Rep., 435; Lee v. Kimball, 45
Me., 172; Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo.
App., 352.
Thus, in St. Paul's Rolling Mills
Co. v. G. W. Despatch Co., supra,
where the consignee had transferred
the bill of lading to a bank as
security for an antecedent indebtedness before his insolvency, and the
unpaid consignor sued the Despatch
Co. for delivering the goods to the
bank after notice of the stoppage
in transitu, NrLsoN,. J., said:
"Authorities differ upon this point,
as to whether an antecedent debt is
a valuable consideration, and some
courts hold that such transfer as
security for a pre-existing debt is
not for a valuable consideration,
and does not defeat the right of.
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the time of the transfer. He does
not take upon himself any additional burdens, nor subject himself
to any additional inconveniences,
and, therefore, there is no reason
why the goods of the consignor
should be taken to pay the debts of
another.
The basis of the cases taking
the contrary view that the consideration is sufficient in such cases,
is tersely expressed by Judge REDFIELD in Atkinson v. Brooks, 26
Vt., 569, when in the course of his
opinion he says: "He certainly
does forego the pursuit of his own
SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, after a
debt, and thus certainly puts himlearned and exhaustive examination of the authorities, declares the self in a different and in law in a
question an unsettled one in that
worse situation, and this must be
regarded asbrimafaie a foreg6ing
State, and in seeking for analogies
as aids in determining the question
of some advantage, and also an
compares and discusses the nature
accommodation to the indorsee,
of the consideration required to
who may fairly be presumed to
protect a purchaser from a vendee
prefer this mode of meeting his
who obtained the goods by fraudu- debt. The transaction, therefore,
lent representations, or from a possesses both the cardinal ingretransferrer of land seeking to de- dients which constitute the textfraud creditors, or from one in
book definition of a valuable conwhose hands the land is subject to
sideration-it is a detriment to the
unrecorded equities, and then says:
promisor and an advantage to the
"But the analogy to the transfer
promisee-and it is no satisfactory
of commercial paper is the most answer, to the case to say that the
direct, though, unfortunately, in
party who takes such bill or note
great conflict. . . -. But since
which proves unproductive is in
this case is really governed by the the same position as he was before.
law of Kentucky, which says that
This is by no means certain; he
the transferee of negotiable paper
has for the time foregone the colas collateral security for antecedent
lection of his debt, and in such
indebtedness is not a bonafide pur- matters time is of the essence of
chaser for value, that law deter- the transaction, and the debtor
mines the question."
thereby gains. time which is often
of the most vital consequence to
The reason given by the States
which follow the rule as laid down
him." In short, it is ordinarily
in Kentucky- may be said to .be fair to presume that although there
that since nothing is surrendered
may not have been an express
by the transferee upon the receipt- agreement to forbear, yet it is necesof the instrument merely as colsarily implied from the nature of
lateral security for an antecedent
the transaction and the object
indebtedness, he is not deprived of
which the parties have in view.
Following this analogy the courts
any right or advantage enjoyed at

stoppage in transitu, but the United
States has announced the rule to be
(Railroad v. Bank, 1O2 U. S., 14)
that such a transfer is not an improper use of commercial security,
and the bona fide holder is not
affected by equities or defences
between prior parties of which
there was no notice. True, in Railroad v. Bank the transfer was of a
promissory note, but the rule extends to all commercial securities,
including bills of lading."
And in the similar case of Conrad
v. Fisher, 37 Mo. App., 432, Judge
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of England (Leask v. Scott, 2 Q. B.
D., 376); Canada (Clementson v.
Grand Trunk Railway, 42 U. C. Q.
B. 273), and the United States (St.
Paul's, etc. Co. v. Despatch Co., 27
F. R., 435), and of the States of
California (Davis v. Russel, 52 Cal.,
6II), and Illinoig (Peters v. Elliott,
321), hold the consideration
78 Ill.,
valuable, while the courts of Alabama (Loeb v. Peters, 63 Ala., 243);
Maine (Lee v. Kimball, 45 Me.,
172), and New York (Barnard v.
Campbell, 58 N. Y., 73), would
permit the consignor to stop the
goods in transit as against the
pledgee for lack of a consideration
sufficient to give the latter a better
equity. If the other States should
follow prior rulings in cases upon
negotiable instruments as collateral
security for antecedent indebtedness, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New J'ersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Texas and Vermont would be added
to the former list, and Arkansas,
Iowa, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia atid
Wisconsin to the litter (Jon:s on
Pledges, iii and 117, Kintzing's
Article, "The Conflict of Laws
Upon the Use of Negotiable Instruments as Collateral Security for Antecedent Indebtedness," 3o AMIRICAN LA-W RBGISTER, N. S., 1891.)
(2) From Estofipel.- Viewed
from the standpoint of estoppel,
the trahsfer of the bill defeats the
consignor's right in .this way: The
consignor has parted with possession of the goods with the intention of. passing the title to the
consignee, and by sending him the
evidence of ownership in the form
of a bill of lading has given him
the apparent right of disposal.
The pledgee acting upon the evi-
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dence of title which the owner has
permitted the consignee to assfime,
has been induced to part with
value upon the faith of the security
thereby indicated. Here evidently
one of two innocent persons must
suffer by the act of the consignee,
and it is but just that he who by
his misplaced confidence has enabled the consignee to occasion
the loss should suffer for it. The
vendor, therefore, is estopped to
deny the right of the consignee to
pass any title to the pledgee.
To accept the view of estoppel as
the reason why the transfer of a
bill of lading defeats the right of
stoppage in transitu is to destroy
the use of a bill of lading as a
security for an antecedent indebtedness. For the rule is founded
upon the reason for it; i. e., that
the consignor should not be allowed
to deny the credit with which he
has enabled another to obtain value
from the pledgee, and since where
the debt is already existing there
can be no advance made or value
given upon the faith of the document, the consignor has not been
the direct cause-of the loss of the
pledgee, and he may stop the goods:
Barnard v. Campbell, 58 N. Y., 575;
Holbrook v. Vose, 6 Bosw., 76';
Lessassier v. The Southwestern, 2
Woods C. C., 35; Rodger v. Comptoir, L. R., 2 P. C., 395, overruled
by Leask v. Scott, L. R.,

2

Q. B.

D., 376.
(3) Fromthe Effect of the Transfer of a Bill of Lading as a Symbolical.Deliveryof the Goods.-The
very nature of stoppage in transitu
as a right exercisable only between
vendor and vendee while the goods
are in transit and until they come
into the possession of the vendee
or some one claiming through him,
shows at once that the true cause
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'of the defeat by the transfer of the
bill of lading is due to its effect as
a symbolical delivery of the goods.
,,O1 the delivery of the bill to the
.ledgee the goods ceased to be in
transit between the vendor and
vendee, for the carrier was no
longer a middleman between them,
"but an agent for the pledgee to
whom the delivery of the'bill had
- acted as a constructive delivery of
the goods: Lord BLACKBURNS in
Sewell v. Burdick, L. R., io App.
Cas., 74, Art. Sewell v. Burdick,
29 Sol. J., 35o.
True, to have
such effect the transfer must be
for a valuable consideration so
as to have passed the property
4n the goods, but this no longer
- depends upon estoppel or the rule
-pn negotiable paper, but upon
whether in the abstract a past
indebtedness is a good .consideration in the purchase of property.
Thus' in Leask v. Scott, 2 Q. B.
,D. 376, Lord BRAMWzL, in overruling Rodger v. Comptoir, supra,
Mid: "We cannot agree with
Rodger v. Comptoir. There is
not a trace of such distinction
between cases of past and present
- consideration to be found in the
books.
It is true there is no
decision the other way but wherever the rule is laid down, it is laid
down without 4ualifications, viz.,
that the transfer of the bill of lading for a valuable consideration to
a bona fide transferee defeats the
right of stoppage in transitu ...
-It--is
true, no doubt, that opinions
must be taken secundum subjectam'materiam, but it is strange
that no judge, no counsel, .no
writer, ever guarded himself against
laying down this rule too widely
by mentioiiing the qualification if
he thought it existed. We cannot
help but say that not only is the
case a novelty, but it is a novelty
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opposed to what may be called.
the silent authority of all the
previous judges and writers who
have dealt with the subject:" Clementson v. Rwy., 42 U. C. Q.B.,
275.
(c) Of the Good. Faith.-Bona
fides on the part of the l5ledgee is
also necessary, but notice of what
fact is sufficient to destroy the
'protection against the exercise of
stoppage is more a question of notice than pf bills of lading.
Obviously a mere fictitious transfer for the purpose of defeatiig the
right will be of no avail: Rosenthal v. Dessan, ri Hun., 49.
Knowledge of the insolvency of
the transferor is evidence of a lack
of good faith: Vertue v. Jewell, 4
Camp., 81; Covell v. Hitchcock, 23
Wend., 61i; Kitchener v.Spear, 30
Vt., 345; Seymour v. Newton, lo5
Mass., 275.
It is said in Holbrook v. Vose, 6
Bosw., 76, that where "the transferee acts upon the faith of-the bill
of lading, he necessarily knows
that the goods are in transit, and
that if not paid for they are subject
to the vendor's right to stop them if
the yendee become insolvent. It
would not, therefore, be inequitable
to hold that with such knowledge,
and knowledge also that the goods
have not been paid for, he makes
his advances subject to the vendor's
right, and does so voluntarily with
knowledge of all the facts." But
even this was a mere criticism of
the general rule which was admitted to be that mere notice that
the goods were unpaid for in the
.absence of notice of facts making
the assignment unfair and dishonest, was not sufficient to destroy
bona fides: Canning v. Brown, 9
East, 409; Salomons v. Nissen, 2
T. R., 687.
MAYNZ R. LONGSTRETH.

